An attempt is made to prepare Computational Linguistics for Situation Semantics.
I INTRODUCTION
The editors of the AI Journal recently hit upon the nice notion of correspondents' columns.
The basic idea was to solicit experts in various fields, both within and outside of Artificial Intelligence, to provide "guidance to important, interesting current literature" in their fields. For Philosophy, they made the happy choice of Dan Dennett;
for natural language processing, the equally happy choice of Barbara Grosz. Each has so far contributed one column, and these early contributions overlap in one, and as it happens, only one, particular;
to wit: Situation~manties. in the context of a proposed model theory of natural language, one that appears to be more compatible with the needs of AI than previous theories .... EI]t is of interest to work in natural-language processing for the kind of compositional semantics it ~ roposes, and the way in which it allows he contexts in which in an utterance is used to affect its interpretation.
What is all the fuss about?
I want to address this question, but rather indirectly.
I want to situate situation semantics in "conceptual space" and draw some comparisons and contrasts between it and accounts in the style of Richard Montague.
To this end, a few preliminary points are in order.
A. The Present Situation
First, as to the state of the Situation Semantics literature. There is as yet no published piece of the scope and detail of either "English as a Formal Language" or "The Proper Treatment of Ouantlficatlon in Ordinary English".
Nor, of course, is there anything llke ~hat large body of work by philosophers and linguists -computational and otherwise -that has been produced from within the Montague paradigm. Montague's work was more or hess the first of its kind.
It excited, quite justifiably, an extraordinary amount of interest t and has already inspired a distinguished body or work, some of it from within AI and Computational Linguistics.
The latter can hardly be said for Moreover there is in the works a ceiiaboratlve effort, to be called Situations andS.
m This will contain a "Fragment of Situation Semantics", a treatment of an extended fra~ent of ~.
Last, for the moment, but not least, is a second book by Barwise and Perry, ~ ~, which will include a treatment of an even more extended fragment of English, together with a self-contalned treatment of the technical, mathematical background.
(By "self-contalned".
understand: not requiring either familiarity with or acceptance of The Big Picture ~ resented in S&A.) The bottom line: there is very Ittle of Situation Semantics presently available to the masses of hungry researchers.
S.
There are important points of similarity between Situation and Montague semantics, of course. One is that both are committed to formulating mathematically rigorous semantic accounts of English. To this end, both, of course, dip heavily into set theory.
But this isn't saying a whole lot; for they deploy very different set theories. Montague, for a variety of technical reasons, was very fond of MKM, a very powerful theory, countenancing huge collections.
MKM allows for both sets and (proper) classes, the latter being collections too big to be elements of other collections, and too big to be sets, say, of ZF. It also provides an unnervingly powerful comprehension axiom.
B&P, on the other hand, have at least provisionally adopted KPU, a surprisingly weak set theory.
Indeed, the vanilla version of KPU comes without an axiom of infinity and (more or less hence) has a model in the hereditarily finite sets.
In that setting, even little infinite coliectlons, llke the universe of hereditarily finite sets, are proper classes, and beyond the pale.
Enough for the moment of set theory, although we shall have to return to this strange land for one more brief visit.
More important, and perhaps more disheartening, similarities are immediately to hand. Both Montague and B&P -thus far -restrict themselves to the declarative fragment of English; Montague, for the obvious reason that he was a model theorist and a student of Tarskl.
For such types, the crucial notion to be explicated is that of "truth mThe collaborators being B&P, Robin Cooper, Hans Kamp, and Stanley Peters. of a sentence on an interpretation".
Moreover. Monta~e
showed no interest in the use(s) of lar~Euage.
Of course people working within his tradition are not debarred from doing so; but any such interest is an extra added attraction.
The same point about model theory, broadly construed, holds for Barwlse-Perry as well; they certainly aren't syntaeticians.
But in their case it is reinforced by philosophical considerations which point toward the use of language to convey information as the central use of language -hence, to assertlng as the central kind of utterance or speech act.
Thus, even when they narrow their sights to this one use, the notion that language is something to be put to various uses by humans to further certain of their purposes is not foreign to Situation Semantics. • Second, B&P (again: so far) stop short at the awesome boundary of the period.
Here again, this was only to be expected; and here again, the crucial question is whether their overall philosophical perspective so informs their account of natural language as to enable a more fruitful accommodation of work on various aspects of extended discourse.
Barbara What made a fragment of English of interest to Montague, then, was that it contained loads of such contexts.
It is as if all of that wondrous machinery, and the technical brilliance to deploy it. were aimed at an analysis of the following sentence: While the was ~ ~seemed to be lookln~ for ~ unicorn who was thinkinK ~ ~ centaur. What is astounding, of course, is that Montague should have been able to pull a systematic and rigorous treatment of such contexts out of the model-theoretlc hat.
When we turn to Situation Semantics, on the other hand, we seem to be back in the linguistic world of flrst-grade readers: Spot ran. ~ saw ~run.
Jane~ that SPot ran. rndee~, t~ malor concern of Barwise-Perry is not the semantics of natural language at all.
They have bigger (well, different) fish to fry. First and foremost, they are concerned with sketching an account of the place of meaning and mind in the universe, an account that finds the source of meaning in nomic regularities among kinds of events (sltuatlons)L regularltles which, in general, are independent of Aar~uage anu mind.
For the frying of said fish, a treatment of cognitive attitudes is essential. Moreover, and not independently, for any attempt to apply their overall philosophical picture to the semantics of natural language, the propositional attitude contexts pose a crucial and seemingly I"A Fragment of Situation Semantics, will contain a treatment of certain kinds of English interrogatives ; further out in the future, Situation ~ will contain such a more extensive treatment.
eeBreaking out of the straightjacket of the sentence is the job of Situations in Discourse. insuperable obstacleo tee Hence the fact that the book ~ and Attitudes precedes Situation -the first lays the philosophical foundations for the second.
Thus the origin of their concern even with the classical problems of the propositional attitudes is different from. though by no means incompatible with, that of Montague's.
Something brief must now be said about ~-big picture. Here goes.
The work of B&P can be seen as part of a continuing debate in philosophy about the source of the intentlonallty of the mental -and the nature of meaning in general; a debate about the right account to give of the phenomenon of one thing or event or state-of-affalrs being able to represent (carry information about) another thlr~ or event or state-of-affalrs.
On one side stand those who see the phenomenon of Intentionallty as dependent on language -no representation without notation. This doctrine is the heart of current orthodoxy in both philosophy of mind and meta-theory of cognitive psychology.
(See, by way of best example, [5] :) It is also a doctrine widely thought to oe presupposed b~ the whole endeavor of Artificial Intelligence.
On another side are those who see the representational power of language as itself based on the intentlonallty of mlnd. It The striking thing about Barwise and Perry is that, while they stand firmly with those who deny that meaning and intentlonality essentially involve language, they reject the thesis that intentlonallty and meaning are essentlaliy mental or mind-lnvolvlng.
The source of meaning and intentlonallty is to be found, rather, in the existence of lawllke regularities -constraints -among kinds of events. For Barwlse-Perry, the analysis of meaning begins with such facts as that: smoke means fire or those In~t mean measles.
The ground of such facts lies e ways of the world; in the regularities between event types in virtue of which events of one type can carry information about events of other types.
If semantics is the theory of meaning, then there is no pun intended in the application of semantic notions to situations in which there is no use of language and, indeed, in which there are no minds.
Meaning's natural home is the world, for meaning arises out of the regular relations that hold among situations, among bits of reality.
We believe linguistic meaning should be seen within this general picture of a world teeming with meaning, a world full of information for organisms appropriately attuned to that meaning, tie [3] There is yet another dimension to the philosophical debate, one to which Barwise and Perry often allude: Some theories stress the power of language to classify minds, the mental significance of language, and treat the meeI shall return to this theme below.
JWho knows? Maybe it is. eeTheae latter can, in turn, be divided into those who seek a naturalistic, in principle physicallst, account and those who, like Frege and Church, pose no such demand.
"eeFor an important philosophical predecessor, see [~] . classification of (external) events as derivative .... A second approach is to focus on the external significance of language, on its connection with the described world rather than the describing mind. Sentences are classified not by the ideas they express, but by how they describe thlngs to be .... Frege adopted a third strategy. He postulated a third realm, a realm neither of ideas nor of worldly events, but of senses.
Senses are the "philosopher's stone", the medium that coordinates all three elements in our equation: minds, words and objects.
Hinds grasp senses, words express them, and objects are referred to by them .... One way of regarding the crucial notion of Intension in possible world semantlos is a development of Frege's notion of sense. [3] Barwlse and Perry clearly opt for the second approach. This is one reason for their concern with the problems posed by the propositional attitudes; for it has often been argued that these contexts doom any attempt at a theory of the second type. This is the burden of the dreaded "Sllngshot" -a weapon we shall ~aze at later. F?r the moment, though, I want simply to note ~ne connection of this dimension with that about the source and nature of intentionality.
Just as (some particular features of) a particular X-ray carries information about the individual on which the machine was trained, e.g., that its leg is broken, so too does an utterance by the doctor of the sentence "It's bone is broken", in a context in which that same individual is what's referred to by • it".
One can, of course, learn things about the X-ray and the X-ray machine as well as about the ~ oor patient; Just so, one can learn thlnEs about he doctor from her utterance.
In both cases, the These collections are proper classes relative to KPU; so, if thls be the last word on the matter, those very regularities so central to the account are not themselves available within the account -that is, they are not (represented by) set-theoretic constructs generated from the primitives by way of the resources of ~PU.
For all such constructs are finite, me ~eedless to say, that isn't the last word on the matter.
Still, this is scarcely the place for an extenced treatment of the issue; I raise it here simply to drive home a point about that first
• Needless to say, we can talk about both minds and mental events and languages and linguistic events~ the key point is simply that a language user is not "really" always talklr~ first and foremost about his/her own mental state.
We are not doomed to pathologlcal self-lnvolvement by being doomed to speak an d think.
l.Assuming that we stick to an interpretation within the hereditarily finite sets, as we can. similarity between Montague and Situation Semantics.
Montague wanted a very strong backEround theory within which models can be constructed precisely because he didn't want to have to worry about any (size) constraints on such models.
B&Pput their money on a very weak set theory precisely because they want there to be such constraints; in particular because they want to erect a certain kind of barrier to the infinite. Obviously, large issues loom on the horizon; let's leave them there.
I want now briefly to discuss 3 major aspects of Situation Semantics, aspects in which it differs fairly dramatically from Montague semantics. In passing.
I will at least j~.. at the interrelationships among these, asloe from particular points of difference, remember that in the background there lurks a general conception of the use of language and its place in the overall scheme of things, a conception that is meant to inform and constrain detailed proposals.
III THE PRINCIPLE OF EFFICIENCY
One other respect in which Barwise and Perry are orthodox is their acceptance of a form of the of , the principle that the meaning of a complex expression is a runctlon of the meanings of its constituents. This is the principle that is supposed to explain the proouctivity or generatlvity of languases, and the ability of finite creatures to master them. So, to adopt their favorite example. if Mitch now says to me, "You're dead wrong", what he says -what he asserts to be the case -is very different from what I would say if I were to utter the very same sentence directed at him. m" The very same sentence is used, "with the same meanir~"; but the message or information carried by its use differs.
Moreover, the difference is systematically related to differences in the contexts in which the utterances are made.
-Barwise and Perry take this phenomenon, often called indexlcality or token-reflexlvlty and all too often localized to the occurrence of particular words (e.g. t I , you , here , now , this , "that"), to oe of the essence of natural languages. They also note, however, that their relational account of meaning shows it to be a central feature of meaning in general.
IT]hat smoke pouring out of the the window over there means that that particular building is on fire. Now the specific situation, smoke pouring out of that very building at that very time, will never be repeated.
The next time we see smoke pouring out a building, it will be a new situation, and so will in one sense mean something else. It will mean that the building in the new situation is on fire at the new time. Each of these specific smoky situations means something, that the building then and there is on fire. This is...event meaning. The meaningful situations had something in common, the~ were of a co~n type, smoke pouring out o~ a building, a type that means fire. This is ...event-tYPe meanin~...What a particular case of smoke pouring out of a buildlng means, what it tells us about the mB&P choose to call such principles "semantic universals" -an unhappy choice, I think.
JeWhlch, of course, ~ would never do.
wider world, is determined by the meaning of smoke pouring out of a building and the particulars of this case of it. [3] Moreover, B&P contend that the fact that modern formal semantics grew out of a concern with the language(s) of matSematics has caused those working within the orthodox model-theoretic tradition either to ignore or to slight this crucial feature.* A preoccupation with the language of mathematics, and with the seemingly e6ernal nature of its sentences, led the founders of our field to neglect the efficiency of language.
In our opinion this was a critical blunder, for efficiency lies at the very heart of meaning. concerning himself so*ely with indexicais and tense and not concerning himself at aii with other issues about the purposes of speakers and hearers and the corresponding uses of sentences. **e In addition, the treatment of formal pragmatics was to follow the lead of formal semantics:
the central notion to be investigated was that of truth of a sentence, but now reiatlve to both an interpretation and a eontext of use or ~oint of reference.
(See [10, 11, 12, 18] .) The working hypothesis" was that one could and should give a thoroughly uniform treatment of indexicallty within the model-theoretic framework deployed for the treatment of the indexlcal-free constructions. Thus, for example, in standard quantificational theory, one of the "parameters" of an interpretation is a domain or universe of discourse; in standard accounts of modal languages, another parameter is a set of possible worlds; in tense logics, a set of points of time.
Why stop there?
It is clear when we ~et to indexicals that the three parameters I've just mentioned aren't sufficient to determine a function to truth-values. Just think of two simultaneous utterances of "You are dead wrong" in the same world, with all other It is a constraint they impose on themselves that they be able to account for significant regularities with respect to "the flow of information", in so far as that flow is mediated by the use of language and in cases where the information is not determined by a compositional semantic theory.
And such cases are the norm. Compositionality holds only at the level of eventtype or linguistic meaning.
The claim is that seeing linguistic meaning as a special case of the relational nature of meaning -that meaning resides in regularities between kinds of situations -allows them to produce an account which satisfies this constraint.
c. Names
$9~" let me say something about proper names and some~nlng ease aoout resource situations.
Let us put aside for the moment the semantic type that poor little "David Israel" gets assigned in [13] These three are the main constituents of the parameter B&P call a discourse situation; note that this one parameter ~ retty much covers the contextual features ontague-Kaplan had in mind.
Suppose also that a dog t otherwise unknown to our speaker and hls/her audience, just walked by the front porch, on which our protagonists are sitting.
When the speaker utters the sentence he/she is exploiting a situation in which bo{h speaker and audience saw a lone dog stroll by; he/she is not describing either that particular recent situation or such a sltuation-type -there may have been many such; the two of them often sit out on that porch, the neighborhood is full of dogs.
Rather, the speaker is referring to a situation in which that dog is barking.
Which dog?. The one "contributed" by the resource situation; the one who just strolled by. It is an aspect of the linguistic meaning of a definite description that a resource situation should enter into the determination of its reference on a particular occasion of use; thus, an aspect of the meanings of sentences that a resource situation be a a parameter in the determination of the interpretations (event meanings) of sentential utterances.
Moreover, one can imagine cases where what is of interest is precisely some feature of which resource situation a speaker is exploiting on a particular occasion.
And here, too, as in the case of names or, more generally, of speaker connections, the claim is that the relational theory of meaning and the consequent emphasis on the centrality of the Principle of Efficiency give Situation Semantics a handle on a range of regularities connecting uses of languages with varieties of information that can be conveyed by such uses.
IV LOGICAL FORM AND ENTAILMENT
As we have noted, Barwlse and Perry's treatment of efficiency goes beyond indexlcality and, as embedded within their overall account, goes well beyond a Kaplan-Montague theory. An important theme in this regard is the radical de-emphaslzlng of the role of entailment in their semantic theory and the correlative fixing on statements, not sentences, as the primary locus of interpretation. This is yet another way in which B&P go beyond Kaplan's forays beyond Montague.
I have said that in standard (or even mildly deviant) model-theoretic accounts the key notion is that of truth on an interpretation, or in a model. Having said this, I might as well say that the key notion is that of entailment or logical consequence.
A set of sentences S entails a sentence A iff there is no interpretation on which all of the sentences in S are true and A i3 false. From the purely model-theoretic point of view, this relation can be thought of as holding not between sentences, but between propositions (conceived of as the intenslons or meanings of sentences). For instance, it might be taken to hold between sets of possible worlds.
Still, it is presumed (to put it mildly)
that an important set of such relations among non-linguistic objects have syntactic realizations in relations holding among sentences which express those propositions.
Moreover, that sentences stand in these relations is a function of certain specifiable aspects of their syntactic type -their "logical form".
In artificial, logical languages, this presumption of syntactic realization can be made more or less good; and anyway, the connections between, on the one hand, syntactic types and modes of composition, and semantic values on the other, must be made completely explicit.
In particular, one specifies a set of expresslons as the logical constants of the language, specifies how to build up complex expressfons by the use of those constants, operating ultimately on the "non-logical constants", and then -ipso facto -one has a ~ erfectly usable and precise notion of loglcai orm. The main reason for this move is that it allows one to develop a fairly standard notion of logical consequence or entailment at the level of sentences.
Roughly, a set of sentences S entails a sentence A iff for every interpretation and for every context of use of that interpretation: if every sentence in S is true in a given context, then so too is A.
Barwlse&Perry are prepared to deemphaslze radically the notion of entaliment among sentences. As they fully realize they must provide a new notion -a notion of one statement following from another.
At the very least then, our theory will seek to account for why the truth of certain ~ follows from the truth of other 9_~.
This move has several important consequences...There is a lot of information available from utterances that is simply missed in traditional accounts, accounts that ignore the relational aspect of meaning...A semantic theory must go far beyond traditional "patterns of inference"...A rather startllng consequence of this is that there can be no syntactic counterpart, of the kind traditionally sought in proof theory and theories of loglcal form, to the semantic theory of consequence.
For consequence is simply not a relation between purely syntactic elements. *Hence part, at least, of the oddity of talk about using such a language by uttering sentences thereof.
What's at stake here?
A whole lot, I fear. First, utterances -e.g., the makings of assertions -are actions.
They are not linguistic items at all; they have no logical forms.
Of course, they typically involve the production of linguistic tokens, which -by virtue of being of such and such types -may have such forms.
( IT]he ~ "Socrates is speaking" does not follow from the sentences "Every philosopher is speaking", "Socrates is a philosopher" even though this argument has the same "loglcal form" (on most accounts of logical form) as ["4 is an integral multiple of 2", "All integral multiples of 2 are even" (so) "4 is even".]
In the first place, there is the matter of tense. At the very least the three sentences would have to be said at more or less the same time for the argument to be valid. Sentences are not true or false; only statements made with indicative sentences, utterances of certain kinds, are true or false.
[3] (The example is mine -D.I.) B&P simplify somewhat.
It is not required that all three sentences be uttered simultaneously (by one speaker).
Roughly speaking, what is required is that the (spatio)temporal locations of their utterance be close together and that the "sum" of their locations overlap with that of some utterance of Socrates.
But that isn't all. The speaker must be connected throughout to one and the same individual Socrates, else a pragmatic analogue of the fallacy of equivocation will result. The same (or something similar) could be said about the noun ~ hrase "every philosopher", for such phrases -just ike definite descriptions -require for their interpretation a resource situation. One can imagine a case wherein a given speaker, over a specified time and at a specified place, connected to one and the same guy named Socrates, exploits two different resource situations contributing two different groups of philosophers, one for each of
*Thls
is what is known in the trade as a stlpulatlve definition. the first two utterances.
(The case is stronger, of course, if we substitute for the second sentence "Socrates is one of the philosophers.") It must certainly seem that too much of the baby is being tossed out with the water; but there are alleged to be (compensating?) gains:
There is a lot of information available from utterances that is simply missed in traditional accounts, accounts that ignore the relational aspect of meaning. If someone comes up to me and says--Melanie saw a bear." I may learn not Just that Melanie saw a bear, but also that the speaker is somehow connected to Melanie in a way that allows him to refer to her using "Melanie".
And I learn that the speaker is somehow in a position to have information about what Melanie saw.
A semantic theory must go far beyond traditional "patterns of inference"
to account for the external significance of language...A semantic theory must account for how language fits into the general flow of information.
The capturing of entailments between statements is Just one aspect of a real theory of the information in an utterance.
We think the relation theory of meaning provides the proper framework for such a theory. By looking at linguistic meanir~ as a relation between utterances and described situations, we can focus on the many coordinates that allow information to be extracted from utterances, information not only about the situation described'ni but also about the speaker and her place the world. [3] A. A ~U.t~ Ã Despite the heroic sentiments just expressed, B&P scarcely eschew sentences, a semantic account account of which they are, after all, aiming to provide.
In the formal account statements get represented by n-tuples (of course), one element of which is the sentence uttered; and if you like. it is the sentence-under-syntactic-analysls.
(This last bit is misleading, but not terribly.) Other elements of the tuple are a discourse situation and set of speaker connections and resource situations. Any%ray, there is the sentence.
Given that, how about their logical form~q?
Before touching on that issue, let me raise another and related feature of the account. This is the decision of B&P to let English sentences be the domain of their purely compositional semantic functions. For Montague, the "normal form" semantic interpretation of English went by way of a translation from English into some by now "fairly standard" logical language.
(Such languages became fairly standard largely due to Montague's work.) Montague always claimed that thl3 was merely a pedagogical and simplifying device; and he provldeS an abstract account of how a "direct" semantic interpretation would go. Still, his practice leaves one with the taste of a search for hidden logical forms of a familiar type underlying the grammmtical forms of English sentences.
No such intermediate logical language is forthcoming in Situation Semantics.
First there is ALIASS:
An Artificial Language for Illustrating Aspects of Situation Semantics... has more of the structure of English than any other artificial language we know, but it does not pretend to be a fragment of English, or any sort of "logical form" of English.
It is Just what its name implies and nothing more.
Next, and centrally, there is English. The decision to present a semantic theory of English directly may make the end product look even more different than it is.
It certainly has the effect of depriving us of those familiar structures for which familiar "theorem provers" can be specified, and thus reinforces the sense of loss for seekers after a certain brand of entailments. Some may already feel the tell tale symptoms of withdrawal from an acute addiction.
There is, however, more to it than that -or maybe the attendant liberation is enough. In an appendix to "Situations and Attitudes", B&P suggest an analogue of propositional logic for statements within a very simple fragment of ALIASS. There is no (sentential) negation and no conditional; but more to the point, there are no unrestricted laws of statement entailment, e.g., between an arbitrary "conjunctive statement" and its two "conjunots".
Things get even worse when we add complex noun phrases to the fragment.
The mind boggles. That is, the only contribution made by a sentence, so embedded, to the whole can be its truth-value.
V THE PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES
In fact, the slingshot is not a "knockdown proof"; that it is not is recognized by many of its major slingers(? Here, too, especially with respect to the second assumption, tricky technical issues about the treatment of singular terms -both simple and complex -in a standard logic with identity are involved.
B&P purposefully ignore these issues. They are interested in English, not in sentences of a standard logic with identity; and anyway, those very same issues actually get "transformed" into precisely the issues about singular terms they do discuss, issues having to do with the distinction between referential and attributive uses of (complex) singular terms.
( The first sentence will stand for all the situations in which Joe eats, the second sentence for those situations in which Joe eats and Sarah sleeps plus those in which Joe eats and Sarah doesn't sleep.
Sarah is present in all of these.
Since she is not present in may of the situations that "Joe eats" stands for, these sentences, though logically equivalent, do not stand for the same entity.
(Obviously B&P are here ignoring the "indexlcality" inherent in proper uses of proper names -D.I.) [3] Notice that without so much as a glance in the direction of a single propositional attitude context, we can see how B&P can avoid certain wellknown troubles that plague the standard modeltheoretic treatments o~ such constructions.* Moreover and most importantly, they gain these fine powers of discrimination among "meanings" without following either Frege into a third realm of sense or Fodor (?) deep into the recesses of the mind. The significance of sentences, even as they occur in propositional attitude contexts, is out into the surrounding world, t* VI THE BOTTOM LINE What's the bottom line?
Clearly, it's too soon to say.
Indeed, I assume many of you will simply want to wait until you can look at least at some treatment of some fragment of English.
Others would llke as well to get some idea of how the project of Situation Semantics might be realized computationally.
For instance, it is clear even from what little I've said that the semantic values of various kinds of expression types are going to be quite different from the norm and much thought will be needed to specify a formalism for representing and manipulating these representations adequately.
Again, wouldn't it be nice to be told something at least about the metaphysics of Situation Semantics, about situations, abstract, actual, factual and real -all four types figure in some way in the account; about events, event-types, courses-of-events, schema, etc?
Yes, it would be nice.
Some, no doubt, were positively lusting after the scoop on how B&P handle the classic ~ uzzles of intensionality with respect to singular erms. And so on.
All in good time. attention should be paid.
At the moment, the bottom line with respect to Situation Semantics is not, I think, to be arrived at by toting up technical details, as bedazzling as these will doubtless be.
Rather, it is to be gotten at by attention precisely to THE BIG PICTORE.
The relational theory of meaning, and more broadly, the centrality in Situation Semantics of the "flow of information" -the view that that part of this flow that is mediated by the uses of language should be seen as "part and parcel of the general flow of information that uses natural meaning" -allows reasoned hope for a theoretical framework within which work in pragmatics ann one theory of speech acts, as well research in the theory of discourse, can find a proper place. In many of these areas, there is an abundance of insight, harvested from close descriptive analyses of a wide range of phenomena -a range hitherto hidden from both orthodox linguists and philosophers.
There are now even glimmerings of regularities.
But there has been no overarching theoretical structure within which to systematize these insights, and those scattered reguiaritles, and through which to relate them to the results of syntactic and formal semantic analyses. Situation Semantics may help us in developing such a framework.
This last is a good point at which to stop; so I shall.
